1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to establish a number of basic results concerning the solutions of a large and important class of functional equations which arise in the theory of dynamic programming. Here we shall be concerned only with the analytic aspects of these equations, and refer the reader to a number of sources, [2; 3; 6; 7; 9; 11 ] , where the underlying processes are discussed in connection with various applications.
We shall in this paper consider only functions of points and point transformations. In a subsequent one we shall treat more general equations involving functionals and operators.
Let p denote a vector representing a point in an iV-dimensional region D, and T(p, q), for all vectors q in some prescribed Af-dimensional set 5, which may consist of a finite number of points, an enumerably infinite set, or which may be a continuum, denote a transformed point lying in D for each p in D. Let f(p) denote a scalar function of p and g(p, q) and h(p, q) be two scalar functions of p and q.
A representative example of functional equations we shall discuss below is (1) f(P) = Sup [g(p, q) + h(p, q)f(T(p, q))].
e This is an analytic equivalent of the "principle of optimality" for multi-stage decision processes; cf. [2; 11] . Apart from their interest in connection with multi-stage decision processes, these equations possess the merit of constituting in many ways a natural extension of linear equations. As such they serve as a valuable bridge between the well-regulated preserve of linear equations and the as yet untamed jungle of nonlinear equations.
In our discussion of these equations, we shall begin with a simple and easily derived inequality relating to the operator in (1) above. This inequality plays a paramount r61e in all our proofs of existence and uniqueness. In the following four sections we shall consider two important subclasses of the equation in (2) . Although the existence and uniqueness proofs for each of these classes follow a similar track, each requires its own detour at an appropriate point.
Following this, we introduce the concepts of "policy space" and "ap-[September proximation in policy space," and show how they lead to monotone convergence of successive approximations to the solution of (1) .
In the next solution we consider the effect upon the solution of (1) of a perturbation in the "forcing function" g(p, q). This is a stability theorem; cf. [4; 5] .
We then discuss a number of possible extensions and generalizations of (1) , which may be treated by means of precisely the same techniques. In passing we note a generalized equation obtained from the calculus of variations, viewed as a continuous decision process.
Following this we turn to an equation not belonging to either of the general classes treated above. Here the technique of monotone convergence plays a vital rdle in establishing the existence of a solution. The uniqueness proof is, however, of a higher level of difficulty.
Finally, in the concluding two sections, we treat the functional equation obtained from "games of survival," cf. [2] , as another illustration of the analysis of equations not of types one or two. Unpublished treatments are in [16; 17] . 2 . A fundamental inequality. Let us consider the two functional transformations (a) Tx(f, q) = g(p, q)+ f f(r)dG(p, q, r), (1) JrG°(
where dG(p, q, r) SiO, and define two additional transformations as follows:
(b) F2(p) = Sup T2(Fx, q).
Q
The inequality we wish to prove is Lemma 1.
Proof. Let us simplify the notation initially by assuming that both transformations in (2) have the property that the supremum is actually a maximum. Let then q=q(p) be a value of q for which the maximum is assumed in (2a), and q = q(p) be a value of q for which the maximum is assumed in (2b). Then we have the following set of equalities and inequalities:
These, in turn, yield
JrGD from which the result in (3) is immediate.
To obtain the result as stated in terms of the supremum it is only necessary to note that the supremum may be obtained arbitrarily closely by the value of the function for some q = q(p). The argument then proceeds via a limiting procedure.
Let us now obtain an extension of (3) which is useful in the theory of twoperson multi-stage decision processes, and, in particular, in the theory of multi-stage games.
Consider the two functional transformations Ti(f, q, q') -ff [g(p, P\ q, q1, r, r') + f(r, r') ]dG(p, p', q, q', r, r'),
Tt(f, q, q') = ff [h(p, p', q, q', r, r') + f(r, r') ]dG(p, p', q, q1, r, r>), where dG^O, and the two additional transformations defined as follows, MP) = Sup Inf Ti(fi, q, q1) = Inf Sup Ti(fi, q, q'),
It is assumed that Sup Inf = Inf Sup for these transformations. This will be a consequence of the von Neumann min-max theorem and its extensions by Ville, Karlin, Ky Fan, and others, in applications. The inequality we wish to prove is
Proof. We have, using q, q', q, Q1 as above, MP) = Tx(q,q',fx) £ Tx&q'.fx) (10) ^Tx(q,q>,fx),
which yields (9). Equations which satisfy these assumptions are called equations of type one. In many cases, it may be more convenient, and natural, to use the norm \\p\\ = XXi \pi\-It will be clear from the argumentation below that the precise form of the norm is of little importance.
Our principal result concerning these equations is the following (1):
Theorem 1. Consider the equation There is a unique solution of (2) which is continuous at p=0, and defined over all of D.
This solution may be obtained as the limit of the sequence {fn(p)} defined as follows:
Alternatively, any initial function ft>(p) which is continuous at p=0 and bounded for ||^|| jgei, p(=.D, may be used in (3b) to yield a convergent sequence. This completes the proof of existence and the proof of the statements concerning convergence and continuity.
To establish uniqueness, let f(p) and F(p) be two solutions of (1) continuous at p=9, and hence defined for all pGD. Let
Since f(p) and F(p) are continuous for £=0, v(anc)-*0 as ra-*<*>. Hence v(c)=0, and f(p)=F(p). 4. A multi-stage decision process of deterministic type yielding an equation of type one. Let us consider the following multi-stage decision process. We start with an initial vector p and choose a transformation T(p, q), for qGS. As a result of this choice, p is transformed into T(p, q) and we obtain a return g(p, q). The process is now repeated ad infinitum and it is required to determine the sequence of choices which maximizes the total return. If we call/(*) this maximum return, we obtain equation (3.1) for f(p).
An interesting example of the above equation is See [2; 7; 9; 10; 11] .
5. Equations of type two. Let us now consider the equation of (1.1) where we impose the conditions (a) g(p, Q)\ is uniformly bounded for all qGS, and \\p\\ go, pGD.
(b) h(p, q)\ S=a<l for all qGS and uniformly in any region \\p\\ go, (1) PGD. (c) \\T(p, q)\\ g 11*11, or D is a bounded region.
Equations satisfying these conditions we shall call equations of type two. We shall demonstrate.
is an equation of type two, there is a unique solution which is bounded in any finite part of D.
The solution may be found by means of successive approximations as before, and the previous statements concerning continuity of the solution remain valid.
Proof. Let
where a<\. From this point on the proof clearly parallels the proof of Theorem 1, 6 . A multi-stage decision process of stochastic type which yields an equation of type two. Let us consider the following multi-stage decision process of stochastic type. At some initial time we have a physical system in a state given by the vector p, and have a choice of a set of transformations {T(p, q)} which will convert p into T(p, q) and yield a return of R(p, q) with probability h(p, q), and with probability l-h(p, q) terminate the process. The problem is that of determining the sequence of choices which maximizes the expected return obtained before the process terminates. If f(p) is set equal to the maximum expected return, it satisfies the equation
An interesting example, which has been discussed in several places, [2; 3; 6; 11], is
where 0<pi, qi, n, st<l. [September Continuous versions are discussed in [18; 19] . 7. Monotone convergence. We have in the preceding sections demonstrated convergence of the successive approximation under assumptions which yielded essentially geometric convergence. Let us now show that, under the assumption that h(p, q) ^0, which is true in all the applications to date, we have at our disposal a method of choosing an initial approximation which will yield monotone convergence.
Let us consider our equation in the form
There are now two functions of particular interest. There is first of all the function/(*) itself, and secondly the function q=q(p) which yields the maximum in (1) . Let us agree to call any function q(p) which is admissible a policy, and a function which yields the maximum, an optimal policy.
It is clear that any particular optimal policy determines /(*) iteratively, and conversely a knowledge of/(*) determines all optimal policies, q(p). We thus have, side by side, two function spaces {/(*)} and {q(p)}; the former will be called function space and the latter policy space.
In view of this duality between function space and policy space, we have the privilege of determining the solution of (1) in one or the other spaces and thus of choosing the most convenient space. In many ways, the determination in policy space is a more natural, more informative, and simpler description of the solution. In particular, we shall show that an initial approximation in policy space always yields monotone convergence in function space.
Let qo=qo(P) be an initial approximation to q(p) and let/0(*) be determined by use of this policy, i.e., (2) fo(p) = g(P, <7o) + h(p, qo)fo(T(p, q0)), and the sequence {fn(p)}, ra = l, 2, • • • , then be determined recursively,
[Having introduced the concept of approximation in policy space, it is now convenient to use the supremum again to bypass questions of continuity over q.] Let us assume, as in the case of equations of types one and two, that sufficient conditions have been imposed to have the sequence \fn(p)} uniformly bounded in any finite portion of D.
It is immediately seen that fi(p) ^fo(p), and therefore, by virtue of the non-negativity of h(p, q), that fn+i(P) =/»(*) for all n. It follows that/"(*) converges to f(p) as ra-*», in any finite part of D.
If q is a member of a finite set S, there is no question of the convergence of {fn(P)} to an actual solution of (3), where the supremum is now a maximum. If S contains a continuum, it is not immediate that/(*) is a solution of
To establish this, we observe that by virtue of the monotone convergence,
On the other hand, we have
for all qG.S and all n. Letting n-»«>, we obtain the reverse inequality to (6), and hence equality. This property of monotone convergence is particularly important in other parts of the theory of dynamic programming, in particular, in applications to the calculus of variations; cf. [3; 13; 15].
8. Stability theorems. In the theory of functional equations a problem of great theoretical interest, with important physical ramifications, is that of the dependence of the solution upon the form of the equation. It is of much interest to determirie those equations which have the property that small changes in the form of the equation effect correspondingly small changes in the form of the solution. For a discussion with reference to differential and difference equations, see [4; 5] , Let us now consider the two equations,
and assume, to begin with, that they are both of type one. We wish to obtain an inequality Sup, \f(p)-F(p)\, pGD, \\p\\ gc.
To obtain this inequality, we employ the method of successive approximations in both equations, setting MP) = Sup g(p, q), <
Let us define Proof. Set Let us show inductively that we have wn(c) g 22*-o «(<x*c), ra^l. Using (4), and the hypotheses governing an equation of type one, this is easily seen.
Letting «-»<», we obtain (6). Similarly, Theorem 4. With the above notation, for equations of type two,
Sup F | (p)-f(p) | g«(c)/(l-a). Il»il£«
The proof follows the same lines as above and is therefore omitted. Similar estimates can be obtained in the cases where h(p, q) and T(p, q) are perturbed.
9. Some directions of generalization. A first generalization of (1.1) is the equation An example of (2) is the equation of "optimal inventory,"
discussed first by Arrow, Harris, and Marschak [l] , and then more extensively by Dvoretzky, Kiefer, and Wolfowitz [20] ; see also [12] , for some particular cases. Similarly, using Lemma 2, we may derive analogous theorems for the functional equation
= Inf Sup| ff [g(p,p',q,q',r,r') + f(r,r')]dG(p,p',q,q',r,r')], an equation occurring in the theory of multi-stage games, as we shall discuss below. See [ll] .
Finally let us mention in passing that many problems in the calculus of variations may be converted into problems involving functional equations having a form analogous to (1) . Consider, for example, the problem of maximizing J(y) =fjF(y, y', t)dt, or more generally the problem of maximizing (6) J(y) = j F(x, y, t)dt, given (7) dx/dt = G(x, y, t), x(a) = c.
Assuming that the maximum exists, we set In this way we obtain analogues of (1.1) involving maximization over function spaces of functional transformations.
The reader who is interested in the above discussion of problems in the calculus of variations as multi-stage decision problems of continuous type may refer to [2; 11; 13; 15] , where the nonlinear partial differential equation corresponding to (9) is discussed for the above case, and for eigenvalue problems.
Analogous results maybe obtained for partial differential equations, variational problems involving translation operators, and so on. These results will be presented subsequently.
10. An equation of the third type. The technique of approximation in policy space which yields monotone convergence, discussed above in §7, is very useful in establishing the existence of solutions of equations of type three, a class defined quite simply as the complementary class of equations of type one and type two.
The uniqueness of the solution of equations of type three is in general a problem of a greater level of difficulty, as we shall see below and in §13.
Let us illustrate these remarks by considering the functional equation Since, by assumptions, /,?_n pki<Ci, the determinant of the system does not vanish and the system has a unique solution, necessarily positive, as we see by solving iteratively. Having determined Fi(xt), the determination of Fi(p) and, hence, Fi(p) for general p, is immediate.
To begin our successive approximations, define (2) fo ( The uniqueness proof is considerably more complicated and proceeds in a series of steps. Let f(p) and g(p) be two bounded solutions of (1). The first step is
Proof. The inequality
is clear. To demonstrate the reverse inequality, we consider four cases:
(*) I owe this felicitous choice of an initial approximation to H. N. Shapiro.
(a) /(*) = 1 + E **/(**),
Consider first the case corresponding to (a). We have
Therefore for all * for which (8a) holds, the lemma is correct. Equation (8a) will hold whenever * is close to xo, since 1 + E*-i Pkf(xk) is less than 2 in this case,andl+/(ri*)^2.Thusl+/(rj*)andl+g(rj*)willfor/ = l,2, • • • ,M exceed the result of the Z,-move for * close to x0. This is an important point since the crux of our proof is the fact that (8a) will always occur after a finite number of moves, by virtue of the condition in (3). Now consider case (8b). We have f(P) = 1 + E Pkf(xk) g 1 +f(TlP), (11) g(P) = 1 + g(TiP) g 1 + E Pkg(xk).
and similarly for (8c). From (8d) we derive
We now iterate these inequalities. For any fixed *, T^T^ ■ ■ ■ Ttnp will be in the region governed by (8a) for ra large enough. Consequently, we obtain
This completes the proof of the lemma. It remains to show that Max* \f(xk) -g(xk)\ =0. Let K be an index at which the maximum is assumed. It follows from the functional equation for / and g that /(**) = l+f(T,xk), l = l(k),
As above we have /(**) = 1 +f(Ttxk) f£ 1 +f(Ti'xk), (16) g(xk) = 1 + g(T{xk) :g 1 + g(Ttxk).
If both inequalities are proper we have
Thus for either / or V we have (18) f(xk) = l+f(Ttxk), g(xk) = 1 + g(Tixk).
This means that the first choices from the position xk can be the same. Consider now the situation for second moves. Using the same argument, we see that the second moves, i.e., the equations lorf(Tixk) and g(TiXk), can also be the same, and so on, inductively.
Let pn=pn(xk) be the distribution achieved after n moves, where the (w + l)st move puts xk into the region governed by (8a). The argument above shows that/and g land in this region on the same move. Thus, Let us consider a physical system which at any time may be in one of the (ra + 1) states specified by the vectors xk, k=0, 1, 2, • • • , ra. Let p = (po, pi, • • ■ , pn) be a probability distribution specifying the probability pk that the system is in the &th state.
It is desired to have the system in the Oth state. At any time we may look at the system and determine the precise state of the system, or we may effect a transformation upon the system which transforms * into Tip, / = 1, 2, • • •, 11, where Ti has the properties described above. Each of these operations consumes a unit time. The problem is that of determining the policy which minimizes the expected time required to transform the system into state 0 with certainty. If /(*) is the minimum expected time required starting from the a priori distribution *, then/(*) satisfies (11.1). 12. Games of survival. Generalities. The theory of two-person multistage games yields a number of equations having the properties of equations of types 1, 2, or 3. A particular class of games of survival yields a functional equation which has many interesting and difficult features.
Let us consider a two-person zero-sum game specified by the game matrix
and assume that the two players P and Q start initially with 0 quantities x and y. Since the game is zero-sum the state of the game is specified at any time by the quantity possessed by A, x. Let x+y=d, a fixed quantity. We now assume that both players, instead of playing to maximize their respective expected gains in each play, play to ruin their opponent. This is a generalized "gambler's ruin" process, a particular type of Markoff process, in which each player has some control over his transition probabilities.
Let us then define for 0<x<d (2) f(x) =the probability that Q is ruined before P when P has x and both players use optimal play, and set/(x)=0, xg0,/(*) =1, x^d.
Assuming that this function f(x) exists, it satisfies the equation f(x) = Min Max E Pi1if(* + <*«) This follows the formulation originally given in [17] ; cf. also [2] . Similarly, if we consider a non-zero sum game where P and Q have respectively the game matrices (4) A = (au), B = (bu), aij + bti = 0, we must now define (5) f(x, y) =the probability that Q is ruined before P when P has x, Q has y, and both players employ optimal play.
This This last equation is of type 1 if a,v+^ij<0, and correspondingly fairly simple to discuss. The more difficult equation is (3). In the following section we shall prove an existence and uniqueness theorem for a particular case for this equation.
13. Games of survival. Existence and uniqueness. We shall prove the following result: There is a unique function f(x) satisfying the inequalities 0 ^f(x) ^ 1, which satisfies (1) and (3).
Proof. To simplify the notation, let us set V(f(x)) as the value of the game whose matrix is Let us define the sequence {f"(x)} as follows.
( It is clear that /i(x) =£/o(x) for all x, and hence inductively that /"+i(*0 /"(x). It follows from the fact that 0g/"(x) gl for all x and ra that/"(x) converges as w-><» for all x to a function/(x).
That/(x) satisfies (5) is a consequence of the continuity of the value of a game as a continuous function of the game matrix. This completes the proof of existence.
Since /o(x) is a monotone increasing function of x, each function /n(x) is monotone increasing, and hence f(x) is monotone increasing. Let us now demonstrate the important result that it is actually strictly monotone. Upon this fact the proof of uniqueness depends. Since, for all p and q, (17) \Tip,q,f-g)\ SA, we see that (16) is an equality, which means that (18) Tip, q, f) = Tip, q, /), Tif, q, f) = T(j, q, /). Since zZi.i ^»2j = 1 if anY °f tne brackets in (19) have absolute value less [September than A, the corresponding coefficient piq,-must be zero. By assumption, y was the largest value for which \f(y)-g(y)\ =A. Hence *~2<Zi = 0, *ig2 = 0.
Since pi + p2 = l, both pi and p2 cannot be zero, which means qi = 0 or <72=0. Turning to the game matrix (20) (*>-« ^ + "\ we see that the strict monotonicity of/(x) as a function of x makes it impossible for gi=0 or ^ = 0 to be optimal play at x=y. This yields a contradiction to A>0 and completes the proof of uniqueness.
We see then that the proof of uniqueness of a strictly increasing solution is relatively easy, with the whole difficulty of the complete uniqueness proof centering about the proof of strict monotonicity.
The method we have employed is quite general and applies to large classes of functional equations. It fails, however, to treat the general case where we assume only that the elements ay of the game matrix A are real quantities.
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